Tempting God by Leftow, Brian
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 31 Issue 1 Article 1 
1-1-2014 
Tempting God 
Brian Leftow 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Leftow, Brian (2014) "Tempting God," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers: Vol. 31 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol31/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
TEMPTING GOD
Brian Leftow
Western theism holds that God cannot do evil. Christians also hold that Christ 
is God the Son and that Christ was tempted to do evil. These claims appear to 
be jointly inconsistent. I argue that they are not.
It is standard Western theism to hold that God not only does no evil, but is 
impeccable—unable to do evil. For Christians, one prominent root of this 
claim is James 1:13, which states that
1. God cannot be tempted by evil.
Yet the New Testament also poses a puzzle for divine impeccability. It 
teaches that
2. Christ is God the Son.
Hebrews 4:15 states that
3. Christ was tempted in all ways as we are.1
And
4. One way we are tempted is by evil.2
(2)–(4) seem inconsistent with (1). They also seem inconsistent with divine 
impeccability. How can someone impeccable be tempted to do evil? How 
could God be tempted to do something He cannot do? After all, I cannot 
be tempted to make it the case that 2  +  2  =  5.
I now argue that a deity unable to do evil can be tempted by evil if 
incarnate. I first explicate (1), giving a partial account of what it is to be 
tempted. There is a moral as well as a modal problem about Christ’s temp-
tations; I develop that next. I then offer three accounts of how Christ could 
be tempted and argue that despite His inability to give in, Christ was mor-
ally responsible for resisting temptation.
1The terms translated “tempted” in the James and Hebrews texts have the same Greek root, 
making the tension between them quite explicit. (My thanks here to Hugh Benson.) 
2It can be morally good to bring about evil, if that evil is the least bad of one’s options. I 
speak throughout of evil it is not morally good to bring about. One can be tempted to bring 
about states of affairs that really would be evil, or that it would really be evil to bring about, 
or that one believes would have one of these properties, or any combination of these. In 
what follows the difference between these does not matter, so I speak of temptation to evil 
indifferently. 
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Temptation
I begin by explicating (1). Its “cannot” opens the (1)-sentence to multiple 
interpretations: it might express many modalities, de dicto or de re. Plau-
sibly James had no inkling of this, and nothing in the text hints at what he 
might have said had he known. But a great many modally precise claims 
the (1)-sentence can express make it hard to see how (1)–(4) can be consis-
tent.3 So we need not linger over this. Let us instead focus on what it is to 
be tempted.
“Macbeth was tempted” can report what the witches did to him: they 
deliberately brought a state of affairs to mind in order to arouse his desires 
and thereby produce a course of action. If you accept (2) and believe that 
the Temptation stories report actual events in literal terms, you should not 
read (1) as denying that someone could tempt God to evil in this sense. 
Even if you don’t read the Temptation stories that way, surely nothing 
kept anyone from doing this to Christ, so charity forbids taking (1) and (2) 
to imply that no-one could have done so.
“Macbeth was tempted” could also report his meeting a situation no-
one deliberately offered, which brought to mind a state of affairs apt to 
arouse his desires and thereby produce a course of action, e.g., seeing an 
accidentally-dropped wallet lying on the ground. That counts as apt to 
produce the relevant desires because it is the sort of thing that often does 
so. We surely should not take (1) and (2) to imply that Christ could not 
have seen a dropped money-bag.
Finally, “Macbeth was tempted” could report his entering or being in 
an inner state, a state of temptation, henceforth being tempted. James, I 
submit, makes a claim about God’s inner state: with respect to doing any 
evil, He cannot be in this condition. We ought to read texts charitably, and 
this is the only reading on which this text makes a plausible claim.
It would be nice if we could treat (1) by setting out what James thinks 
it is to be tempted. But if James had any view of this, the text does not re-
veal it. So we can only seek the most charitable reading—i.e., suppose that 
James meant to speak of whatever being tempted really is, and ask what 
being tempted really is. My purposes here don’t require a full analysis of 
this. I can make do with some of its necessary conditions.4 If I am tempted 
to eat a cookie,
– I am considering a state of affairs—my experiencing the pleasure of 
eating the cookie.
3There is a problem if God is tempted in no metaphysically possible world, but equally 
if He is tempted only in no physically possible world, given that we live in a physically 
possible world. If we take the necessity as de re, the problem is obvious. If it is de dicto, the 
individual who is God can be tempted only if this individual can cease to be God—and it is 
fairly plausible that anything divine would be eternally divine by nature.
4Here I’m indebted to suggestions by Alfred Mele and the Editor.
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– I occurrently want it to obtain. If I did not want this, the state of 
affairs could not draw me toward doing anything. If having dispo-
sitional desires sufficed for being tempted, I could be tempted to eat 
in dreamless sleep, with nothing going on that is in any way related 
to eating or feeling pleasure. If I merely have a standing disposition 
to want the pleasure or an inclination to obtain it, I merely have a 
standing disposition or inclination to be tempted by it. I am not ac-
tually tempted by it.
– there is a type of act I believe would bring it about, namely eating 
the cookie.
– I occurrently want to do an act of this type.
– I also have something against eating the cookie, which is actually 
rendering me somewhat ambivalent about whether to eat it. If I did 
not, eating the cookie would not be something I am tempted to do. It 
would simply be something I want to do. I want to continue writing 
right now, but it would be strange to say that I am tempted to do so, 
because nothing in me resists it. I have no hesitation to overcome. 
I just plain want to write. A state of temptation essentially involves 
wanting to do the act one has in view, but also wanting or having 
some resolve not to do it. Thus in particular an act’s being wrong 
is not enough to make wanting to do it constitute being tempted 
to do it. If I am wholeheartedly in favor of doing a wrong act, I am 
not tempted to do it. I simply want to do it.5 Only if something in 
me opposes it can I be tempted to do it. The opposition cannot be 
trivial, either. Suppose the only thing in me opposing doing wrong 
were a weak impulse or an intention I do not feel strongly drawn to 
maintain. That is, suppose I were almost wholeheartedly for it. Then 
I wouldn’t be tempted to do wrong either. I would simply be for it, 
but with a slight hesitation. For my desire to do evil to count as a 
temptation, I must be significantly invested in not doing it. Whatever 
I have against doing it must be sufficiently forceful or important 
(etc.) to create at least some genuine ambivalence.
– suppose that whenever I start to want to eat the cookie, there is al-
ways something else I want to do much more, doing which is incom-
patible with eating it, and so I never take eating the cookie seriously. 
Though I want the cookie, then, eating it is never a live option. If this 
is so, then even though at times I satisfy all the conditions above, 
it would be odd to say I was ever really tempted to eat the cookie, 
5This is true even if a deliberately offered tempting situation induced the want. The 
witches tempted Lady Macbeth by tempting her husband, but she was not merely tempted 
to have Duncan killed. She wholeheartedly wanted it done. Further, an act’s being wrong or 
evil is not a necessary condition of being tempted to do it. I can be tempted to do a dumb 
stunt it is not evil or wrong to do. It may not even be unvirtuous, as the prudence it offends 
against need not be the moral sort.
6 Faith and Philosophy
even in a minor way. So to constitute a temptation, a desire to act 
must be salient: strong enough and so-related to other desires as to 
make doing what that desire is a desire to do a live option. Despite 
the salience condition, however, a desire need not be conscious to 
be part of a state of temptation.6 I may not be aware that I want to 
be admired, nor that this is drawing me to do a foolhardy stunt, 
nor that I even want to do the stunt. All the same, I could be being 
tempted to do the stunt. If it sounds odd to say that an unconscious 
desire can pose a temptation, consider that one way we can fail to be 
aware that we want something is by deceiving ourselves.7 Where a 
desire shames us, for instance, we may hide it from ourselves—and 
shameful desires can pose the biggest temptations. Thus temptation 
can be both unconscious and morally significant.
So being tempted involves at least two desires, wanting a state of affairs to 
obtain, and wanting to do some act(s) to bring it about. Merely wanting to 
feel cookie pleasure is not enough to be tempted. Temptation is to do or not 
do something (if only give rein to some emotion), and so being tempted 
takes wanting to do something, namely eat the cookie. If Noble, a good 
person in deep debt, is offered money to commit murder, Noble might re-
fuse and later say, “I wanted the money badly. But I had no desire at all to 
commit murder. In fact the thought repelled me. So though I wanted the 
money, I was not at all tempted.” This could (I submit) be a correct report 
of not being tempted, not of overcoming temptation. Finding the state of 
affairs I have the money attractive does not entail being tempted to do what 
it takes to bring that state of affairs about. As there was nothing attractive 
about murder, Noble did not want to do the act needed to obtain the money; 
as a result, there was just no temptation, though Noble wanted the money. 
Someone who is tempted does not just want to have what is offered, but 
also to some extent inclines to satisfy that want, i.e., has some desire to act.8
Our necessary conditions for being tempted yield a plausible sugges-
tion about why (1) is true.9 God has desires.10 He can want states of affairs 
6Pace A. T. Nuyen, “The Nature of Temptation,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (1997), 96.
7In whatever way self-deception is possible.
8The two desires could in principle have the same object: the state of affairs I desire to 
obtain might just be that I do an action. Even so, it is one thing to desire that an act be done 
by me, and another to want to do it. If I am severely agoraphobic, I may desire that an act of 
going outside be done by me—I might wish I could go outside—but all the same be so fearful 
that I do not want to go outside. I might not be motivated to go outside at all. An action-de-
sire, a want-to-do, has to include some motivation to act. (For the concept of an action-desire, 
see Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 16.)
9I cannot call it more than a plausible suggestion because I have not claimed that the 
conditions are jointly sufficient for being tempted. As I leave it open that there may be other 
conditions, I must allow that some further condition I have missed might provide a better 
explanation. If you think my conditions jointly sufficient, you can take this as the only avail-
able explanation.
10Or their functional equivalents. Swinburne insists that God has no desires, but acts only 
from purely rational considerations (Richard Swinburne, The Christian God [Oxford: Oxford 
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to obtain and want to act.11 If there are reasons against actions, as omni-
scient He knows them. It is possible that He have enough reason to act to 
make an act a salient option for Him, but enough reason against to consti-
tute significant pressure against doing it. Thus if (1) is true, plausibly what 
must be lacking in God is desire to do an evil act: knowing that it would be 
evil to do an act is sufficient for Him not to want to do it.
This has consequences. Necessarily, if an act would be evil, God knows 
this. Necessarily, if He knows this, He does not want to do it. So God 
cannot want to do an evil act. If He cannot want to do evil, He could do it 
voluntarily only by a wholly irrational, unmotivated choice, to do an act 
He believes He has sufficient reason not to do and which He in no way 
wants to do. This would go beyond akrasia. The weak-willed do what 
they want to do, despite knowing that they have more reason not to do 
it. This would be doing what He does not want to do, despite having no 
desire to do it, knowing this, and knowing that He has more reason not to 
do it. I’m not sure this sort of sheer perversity is really possible. But in any 
event, God cannot act irrationally. If so, then, God can’t do evil voluntarily. 
So if God cannot want to do evil, He cannot do it voluntarily.12 So our 
explanation of (1) implies that an impeccable God is not free to do evil.13
Further, as omniscient, He knows this. So we can raise another puzzle 
about (1)–(4): how could a perfectly rational God be tempted to do some-
thing He knows He is not free to do? How could He be tempted voluntarily 
to do something He knows He cannot do voluntarily?
The Evil of Temptation
So far, (1)–(4) have raised a modal and a freedom puzzle. I now add a 
specifically moral puzzle. Someone impeccable cannot deserve blame. 
Being tempted to evil (I shortly argue) is often blameworthy. If Christ was 
tempted “in all ways as we are,” He met a normal human life’s worth 
of temptations. Could a normal human life include only excusable temp-
tations to evil? I now put this last puzzle in place by considering the 
blameworthiness of temptation to evil.
On one main approach to the scope of moral responsibility, we clearly 
can be blameworthy for being tempted toward evil. On this approach, 
we can deserve moral blame or praise for anything which so expresses 
our rational judgments and values that it is “appropriate, in principle, to 
University Press, 1994], 66–67). If this is correct, His grasp of relevant reasons serves as the 
functional equivalent of having a desire—motivating behavior, producing pro-attitudes, etc.
11Or (Swinburne again) grasp the relevant reasons and appropriately incline toward ac-
tion.
12It should be clear that if Swinburne is right and there are no divine desires, we can 
adjust the argument accordingly.
13Some might argue that if so, He cannot be morally responsible for doing good. I dis-
agree. See my “Necessary Moral Perfection,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989), 240–260, 
and “Infinite Goodness,” in The Infinity of God, ed. Benedikt Gocke (University of Notre 
Dame Press, forthcoming). 
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ask (us) to defend or justify it” on the basis of those.14 On this approach, 
we are blameworthy for many states of temptation. If I am tempted to 
steal Jones’s million dollars, this is (we can suppose) an outflow of my 
underlying bad character and values. It would be appropriate to ask me to 
defend wanting to take the money; we might do so to begin to show that 
the desire expresses indefensible values. So on the “expressive” account, 
my temptation is blameworthy.
On the more usual approach, we can be blameworthy only for things 
we can control directly and immediately (e.g., what choices we make) and 
things with the right relation to what we can control directly and immedi-
ately. So on this account, whether we can deserve blame for being tempted 
depends on the relation between being tempted and our control. Being 
tempted is primarily a matter of having desires, and so the matter turns 
on the extent to which we can control our desires. We usually have little or 
no immediate control of desires. A desire shows up whether we want it to 
or not; there seems nothing we can do then about its showing up then. But 
we have at least two sorts of indirect control of some desires.
Over time, we can affect the desires we involuntarily start to have, by 
exposing ourselves to appropriate influences. We cannot immediately 
cause ourselves to believe what we wish, but we can alter our beliefs over 
the long term by appropriate exposure to evidence and argument. So too, 
over time, we can change some of what we want or how we want it. I 
could have done something about being tempted to steal Jones’s million. 
I could have undertaken a course of moral self-improvement or spiritual 
direction. Over time, that might well have weakened my desire to steal or 
heightened my feelings against stealing to the point that stealing was no 
longer tempting, and could have made me not want to steal at all.
We also have some influence over whether a desire continues unabated. 
We can change the focus of our attention. If I am thinking about Jones’s 
money, I can make myself think about something else. It isn’t effective to 
tell myself not to think about Jones’s money. We all know that this will 
cause such a thought. But I can just move on, and if the money continues 
to pop back to mind, I can just move on again and again. Sometimes the 
change sticks. If I manage to stop thinking about Jones’s money, I at least 
demote my desire for it from conscious and salient to unconscious and 
less-salient. This might stop my being tempted. I can only say “might” 
because an unconscious desire can figure in a state of temptation. But 
plausibly a temptation demoted to unconsciousness is often lesser and 
14Angela Smith, “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment,” Philosophical Studies 
138 (2008), 369. The seminal paper here is Robert M. Adams, “Involuntary Sins,” Philosophical 
Review 94 (1985), 3–31. For other views of this sort see Angela Smith, “Control, Responsibility, 
and Moral Assessment,” 367–392, and “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity 
in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (2005), 236–271; T. M. Scanlon, “The Significance of Choice, “ in 
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, v. 8, ed. S. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah 
Press, 1988), 149–216; Gila Sher, “Kantian Fairness,” Philosophical Issues 15 (2005), 179–192, 
and “Out of Control,” Ethics 116 (2006), 285–301.
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currently less-pressing. Moreover, if I cease to think about Jones’s money 
consciously, I might cease to have a specific desire for Jones’s money, 
though I may still have a general standing occurrent non-conscious desire 
for any money I can get my hands on. My knowledge that Jones has a 
million I could grab could so recede into the background that it could be 
something like temporarily forgotten.
I directly and immediately control whether I try to affect my desires, I 
can try, there is a fair chance that it will work if I try, I am responsible to 
try, I can know all this and I am responsible to know it. Let’s suppose that 
I knew all that, that I had good reason to think spiritual direction would at 
least partly succeed and that in fact, had I worked at it, my desire to steal 
would have vanished before I heard about Jones’s money—and yet I did 
nothing. Then my desire to steal (or at least its intensity) is blameworthy 
on a control-based account, even though I cannot directly and immedi-
ately control its occurring.15 If the desire occurs or continues unabated, it 
is my fault. So then is my temptation to steal.
Some might say that what deserves blame here is only my voluntary 
omission of desire-altering measures: that the temptation itself is regret-
table, a moral flaw, perhaps a sign of vice, but not strictly blameworthy. But 
if something happens due to my omission, it is my fault that it happens. 
If I am piloting a ship, I leave the wheel (omitting to control the ship), and 
the ship then runs aground, the grounding is my fault. We deserve blame 
for things that are our fault, even if our contribution to their happening 
is only a crucial omission. I might deserve censure merely for leaving the 
wheel, but I deserve more if the ship actually runs aground. So I deserve 
blame for being tempted if I contribute the crucial omission to this.
Suppose I learn to read minds. I read yours. I burst out with a shock, 
“you’re lusting after my wife!”16 I am not just expressing anger and 
protest. I’m blaming you for your desire. I’m treating it as your fault, as 
something for which I legitimately rate you lower as a moral agent. I could 
continue, “it’s wrong of you to lust after her: stop!” In this I would follow 
Christ, who held that lust is adultery in the mind—that is, a sin. Lust is 
a desire. You have no immediate voluntary control of it. But still, you are 
responsible not to lust, and your lusts are your responsibility even if they 
begin involuntarily. Lusting after my wife may well constitute part of a 
state of temptation to do evil. So lust can provide a case of blameworthy 
temptation. The more cases one can generate, the more severe the specifi-
cally moral puzzle, because the less likely it seems that a normal human 
life could involve only blameless temptations.
15This is just a rough, broad-brush account of a control-based sufficient condition for 
blameworthiness. It may be controversial even within the control-based camp and even 
apart from the issue about luck I go on to raise. But I need not tweak it further; if the luck 
problem can be handled, any plausible tweaks would not affect my main point, which is just 
that on control-based accounts of responsibility, sometimes being tempted is blameworthy. 
16To get a “clean” case, suppose that you are not currently even trying to control yourself.
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The Luck Objection
My claims court an objection from moral luck. Having moral luck consists 
in having factors outside your control affect what you wind up praise- or 
blameworthy for.17 If you are blameworthy for being tempted and you 
have no direct control over what desires you begin to have, it is bad moral 
luck to meet a situation that prompts a temptation-constituting desire, and 
then to have the desire. Some theorists of moral responsibility deny the 
existence of moral luck, arguing that anything subject to luck is ipso facto 
not our responsibility.18 If this is correct, then if it is luck that the ship runs 
aground or that I meet a situation that causes a temptation-constituting 
desire, I am not blameworthy for either.
Moral luck comes in importantly different varieties.19 The varieties raise 
different issues, and I cannot fully discuss even one sort in a paper pri-
marily about something else. All I can do now is briefly argue the existence 
of moral luck due to consequences of our acts or omissions. Suppose I pull 
a pound from my wallet, intending to help Beggar 1. Beggar 2 is near, and 
is stronger than either I or 1. 2 can knock 1 down, seize the pound from 
me and run off. If 2 tries, 2 will succeed. I do not control whether 2 tries. 
So I do not control whether I succeed in helping 1. If I succeed, it is just 
good moral luck that I help 1; I happened to find 2 feeling placid. Yet I 
deserve praise for helping 1 even if 2 is near. For I would have deserved 
praise for this had 2 been nowhere near, and the mere fact that 2 is near 
can’t make my act non-praiseworthy. If I deserve praise for it, I am morally 
responsible for it. So luck about the consequences of my attempt to help 
1 affects what it is that I am morally responsible for: there is this sort of 
moral luck. Another way to make the same point: my luck about 2 deter-
mines whether I am responsible for helping 1 or only for attempting to 
help 1. Moral luck opponents would typically bite the bullet here and say 
that I am not responsible for helping 1, but only for attempting to do so.20 
But taken consistently, this position removes completed actions altogether 
as objects of moral evaluation. It removes even bodily attempts, since it is 
just good moral luck that my body functions well enough just then to let 
me pull the pound from my wallet. The position limits moral evaluation 
to character and intention. I suggest that this is too radical a surgery on 
the subject matter of ethics to accept.21 Another move might be to say that 
I deserve praise for helping a beggar, but not for helping 1 in particular. 
17For the general issue, see Thomas Nagel, “Moral Luck,” in Moral Luck, ed. Daniel 
Statman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 57–72.
18See e.g., Michael Zimmerman, “Luck and Moral Responsibility,” Ethics 97 (1987), 374–
386, and “Taking Luck Seriously,” Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002), 553–576.
19See Nagel, “Moral Luck.”
20See e.g., Zimmerman, “Luck and Moral Responsibility,” and “Taking Luck Seriously.”
21As I’ve indicated, a great deal more should be said here. Ultimately, in regard to moral 
luck, we have a genuine conflict between strong intuitions about responsibility. There is no 
easy, cost-free solution to it. I hope to argue elsewhere that the cost of rejecting consequential 
luck is greater than the cost of admitting it.
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This seems paradoxical: the only thing I did to earn praise for helping a 
beggar was help 1.
We can deserve praise or blame for things we do not directly and im-
mediately control, if they bear the right relation to things we do so control. 
It may be bad moral luck that I meet something that provokes a desire 
that then constitutes a state of temptation toward evil, but I submit that if 
the conditions above are met, I am blameworthy for the desire’s and the 
temptation’s occurring.22 I now take up approaches to (1)–(4).
The Ambiguity Approach
One can render (1)–(4) consistent by taking “tempt” to be ambiguous in 
(1) and (3). (1), I’ve argued, concerns God’s inner state. On a legitimate al-
ternate translation, Hebrews 4:15 tells us that Christ “was tested in all ways 
as we are.” That a test occurred is a matter of His external circumstances, 
not His internal state: contradiction averted. Trying to scratch a diamond 
tests its hardness even if it is physically impossible that the diamond fail 
the test. Still, I do not think we can rest with this. Even if we can tame 
the Hebrews verse, we still have the puzzle of how Christ responded to 
those tests, given His divine character, and whether those responses are 
enough like ours to undergird Hebrews’s further claim that He is humanly 
sympathetic with our tests. Henceforth, then, I read (3) as making inter alia 
claims about Christ’s internal state. I now offer three ways to understand 
that state.
The State-desire Approach
My first says that (3) makes two claims. One is that Christ met things that 
typically induce states of temptation in humans, in an amount and variety 
somewhere in the normal range for a human life. So He was tested in all 
ways as we are: by the same things that test us. (3) also asserts that when 
He met these, Christ had in many cases the very types of state-desires we 
have when we are tempted: He was also tested by human nature, as we 
are. But on my first way to understand Christ’s inner state, He did not 
form the corresponding act-desires, and (3) does not say that He did.23 So 
my first suggestion adds to the ambiguity approach: (3) says that Christ 
was tested, but also makes a claim about Christ’s inner state, that He had 
certain state-desires but not certain act-desires.
Suppose that He did not. Then He had something like states of tempta-
tion, but not states of temptation strictly speaking. Still, these state-desires 
pressed Him toward wrongdoing as they do us. It is this pressure, the 
felt force of the state-desire, that in us often produces an act-desire. It’s 
22Or at least for its occurring with its full intensity, depending on the facts of the case.
23Having state-desires for evil states or states it would be evil to bring about does not 
constitute wanting to bring them about (they are not act-desires) or being willing so to act 
(one can have a state-desire but be unwilling to do anything about it) or consenting to any 
degree to acting so (one can have a state-desire but have no desire to bring about the state 
in question).
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because I first want it to be the case that I experience cookie-taste that I 
then want to eat the cookie. If I do form the latter desire, I now have two 
wants, not one, for two things, not one. But at least part of the motive 
force of the act-desire is just the transmitted force of the state-desire. We 
can see this as follows. Suppose I want to experience cookie taste, I thus 
want to eat the cookie, and the only reason I want to eat it is that I want 
to experience cookie-taste. (I’m not hungry. Eating is not a hobby. Etc.) 
If eating attracts me only as a way to experience cookie taste, eating and 
experiencing cookie taste do not seem better to me than just experiencing 
cookie taste, or have more motive force to me than the latter alone does. If 
the only reason I want to eat is to experience cookie taste, then for me it is 
as if the eating has no intrinsic value, but only an extrinsic value entirely 
derivative from experiencing cookie taste. If this is so, the motive force 
of my desire to eat cannot be greater or less than the motive force of my 
desire to taste, nor can the motive force of the two desires together be 
greater than that of the desire to taste. So the desire to eat simply transmits 
the force of the desire to taste. Thus I am not under more psychological 
pressure to eat than I would be if I just wanted to experience the taste, 
knowing that if I eat the cookie, I will taste it.
This shows that in ordinary cases, part of an act-desire’s motive force 
is just the motive force of the state-desire(s) for the state(s) the act would 
bring about. Now in ordinary cases, we may also value doing the act, 
not just the state(s) the act brings about. But even in this case, motivation 
really comes from state-desires. If I want to do the act due inter alia to 
something about the doing of it, the state-desire that I be doing the act or 
enjoying whatever value the doing brings is distinct from the act-desire 
to do it, and the act is to realize the state, i.e., satisfy the state-desire. We 
act to bring about states of affairs. So act-desires’ motive force just is the 
force of the state-desires that beget them. They transmit the force of state-
desires. They do not add to it. Compare: means are for the sake of ends. So 
the motive force of means is just the motive force of the ends they serve, 
and if the means seem to have motivational force of themselves, that is 
because the using of the means has become partly an end itself. If all this is 
correct, then even if nothing produced in Christ any act-desire to do evil, 
if the inducements He met produced the appropriate state-desires, they 
pushed Christ to do evil precisely as hard as they would have pushed us. 
And so Christ was tested in all ways as we are, in the sense that things 
that psychologically press us toward evil pressed Him toward evil just as 
hard.24 
Some might object that if Christ has no act-desire to make food, the 
Devil’s mention of obtaining bread exerts no psychological pressure.25 But 
this just seems wrong. Christ is hungry. He feels hunger-pain. He has a 
24Again, the Greek root here, “peirazw,” can be translated “test” as well as “tempt.” Pres-
sure tests even if it does not strictly tempt.
25So one referee.
13TEMPTING GOD
state-desire that the state of affairs I am fed and not in pain be actualized: 
that is, He wants to be fed and pain-free. He knows that He can make food 
and that if He makes it, He can eat it. The want to be fed and pain-free 
might well intensify when the Devil directs His attention toward it, bread 
comes to mind and this knowledge becomes psychologically salient. That 
is plenty of pressure to make food. Wanting the end produces psycholog-
ical pressure to take the means. Wanting to be fed produces psychological 
pressure to get food. Act-desires do not add psychological pressure to do 
a dirty deed. They just take us one more step down the road toward doing 
it: we desire the means (doing the act) as well as the end (being in the 
state the act will produce). If act-desires merely transmit the psychological 
force of the related state-desires, a desire to take the means—i.e., to do 
what will bring about the desired state—is not an independent source of 
psychological pressure.26 Christ does not come to want to make food, but 
He does want food, and that presses Him to make it. Earlier I said that 
Noble, repelled by murder, was not tempted to accept the money. But 
Noble wanted the money badly. That did press him to accept it. Aversion 
kept the state-desire from producing an act-desire, but the state-desire 
was fierce (we can suppose), and made worse by the offer. A fierce desire 
is psychological pressure to have what the desire is for. Pressure to have 
the end is pressure to use the means, even if it doesn’t produce a desire to 
do so.
On the present picture, Christ resists temptation at an earlier point than 
we usually do: that is, He aborts the move toward a bad act at a logically 
and perhaps temporally prior point. Inducements tend to lead us to act-
desires; if they do and we resist, we resist satisfying these. On the present 
picture, Christ resists even forming the act-desire.27 He not only resists 
doing what it takes to have what tempts, He resists wanting to do what 
it takes. Temptation presents Christ an inducement not just to act, but to 
want to act; He resists even the want. It presents Christ an inducement to 
be tempted; Christ resists being tempted. This isn’t what we do when we 
resist temptation—we are tempted and resist doing what we’re tempted 
to do. But it is different because it is a more complete moral achievement.
26Suppose I want to have Jones’s million and so form an act-desire, to steal it. Stealing 
may attract me also because I enjoy it. But that increment of motive force arises because of 
an associated state-desire: I want it to be the case that I feel the pleasure of stealing. Stealing 
tempts me because of more than one state-desire, not because an act-desire has a motive 
force of its own to contribute. Here many state-desires lead to the forming of an act-desire 
which transmits their joint force.
27It should not sound odd to speak of resisting forming an act-desire. We can do this 
ourselves; we can resist forming sexual act-desires, for instance, by simply not looking at 
certain things, or by changing our attention as quickly as we can, or by forcing our thoughts 
into another path. Thus we can be blamed for not doing so, and Catholic moral theology 
makes “lingering delectation” of an occasion for such desires itself a sin (so e.g., Aquinas, 
ST II:1, 74, 6). It may sound odd to say that Christ resists doing something He cannot do. (It 
did sound odd to the Editor.) But this (I submit) gets things backward. Christ cannot do it 
because it is His nature to resist it.
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On the present picture, then, (1)–(4) are compatible. God cannot be 
tempted: He cannot form act-desires to do evil. Nor can Christ. (3) speaks 
of testing, not tempting, and its “in all ways” makes a claim about ex-
ternal inducements, state-desires and degree of psychological pressure. 
Christ could be psychologically pressed to do something He knew He was 
not free to do, somewhat as a prisoner can be psychologically pressed to 
leave jail; He can be pressed to do what He cannot do, as a diamond can 
be pressed to scratch.28 If Christ never formed the necessary act-desires, 
He never entered a full state of temptation, though He had something 
functionally similar. Thus there are no blameworthy states of temptation 
to worry about. There may be a residual worry about blameworthy state-
desires. I address this below.
Restricted Temptation
My first approach makes Christ’s inner life distinctly different from ours. 
Some might prefer to see Him as more like us. So here is another way to 
deal with (1)–(4): let Christ enter into genuine full states of temptation, but 
take a weak reading of (3), on which its “all” does not range over all, or 
all sorts, or even a representative sample of sorts, of temptations humans 
face. If we want to restrict Christ’s states of being tempted to those for 
which He is not blameworthy, but allow Him temptations toward evil, 
we will want to show that He is not blameworthy for these. There are 
two broad views of the scope of moral responsibility. They agree on some 
classes of blameless temptation. We might therefore consider restricting 
Christ’s being tempted toward evil to cases that fall in these classes.
On the most common sort of view, one is morally responsible only for 
what either is under one’s direct, immediate control or bears some appro-
priate relation to what one so controls. Suppose, then, that our desires are 
blameworthy only if they bear some appropriate relation to our control—
e.g., only if our prior voluntary actions could have controlled them without 
unreasonable effort. If that’s true, we often can’t be blamed for wanting 
what we want, even when they are bad wants to have, because there is 
nothing we have omitted to do which could have led by reasonable effort to 
our not having those desires. Perhaps the desires in Christ’s states of temp-
tation were always of this sort. He may have been tempted in the Garden to 
avoid the Cross: if He was, desires to stay alive or avoid pain would have 
animated this. If these can be extirpated at all, the effort involved would 
surely be unreasonable in itself, and a fortiori because the result would 
arguably not be a good state to be in. But I suspect that these desires are 
just natural to humans, and so unavoidable. In the Temptation narrative, 
the Devil whispers, “If you are the Son of God, tell these stones to become 
bread” (Matthew 4:3). If this produced a state of temptation, that was due 
to desire for food. That desire is surely natural and was unavoidable by 
28And He can resist doing what He cannot do, as a diamond can resist scratching: it 
cannot be scratched because it is its nature to resist that sort of pressure.
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any reasonable purely human means then open to Him.29 Jesus takes the 
challenge to jump off the Temple pinnacle as tempting Him to test God’s 
provision for Him. Desire not to be in pain and to be fed would have ani-
mated any temptation Christ had in the desert to think that God might not 
always be providing for Him, and so any temptation to test this. The last 
desert temptation was an offer of power and glory. The desire to aggrandize 
oneself and lord it over others is likely part of our simian inheritance, again 
a matter beyond our control. So the temptations of which a Christology 
must take explicit account can be handled in this way.
The “expressive” account also allows this move. For desires one cannot 
help having do not depend on one’s rationally-adopted values in any dis-
tinctive way: I will want to eat if I fast no matter what my convictions. 
Thus these desires do not express any value dependent on my rational 
judgments. It is not appropriate to ask me to rationally defend wanting 
to eat. Desires like this express values resistant to rational judgment or 
criticism: I will want to eat when hungry even if I tell myself not to do so, 
and this involves placing a value on eating, even if it is one against which 
a second-order desire or a judgment incline me.
The “expressive” approach raises another issue, as it allows that state-
desires that reflect corrupt values can be blameworthy even if beyond 
control. Well, it’s no stretch to suppose that Christ had no corrupt values. 
He was perfect in virtue. So (for instance) He was perfectly loving and 
merciful. That is not compatible with (say) placing a high value on tor-
turing animals. Christ’s suite of perfect virtues, then, plausibly would rule 
out bad values. But suppose He had had some. Christ might still have 
been blameless for the related desires and any relevant temptations in 
two ways, even on the “expressive” approach. Consider a case of corrupt 
values: suppose that because you were brought up in the Hitler Youth, 
you have a state-desire for the extermination of the Jewish race.30 To me, it 
is one thing for this desire to be a defect, something to regret, and another 
for it to be a fit subject for blame. Suppose that you have no act-desire to 
help exterminate Jews, and have tried your best but failed to eliminate 
that state-desire: or suppose that you do have the act-desire and have 
similarly tried and failed. You just cannot manage to do anything about 
either. Then I submit that these desires are something like a moral dis-
ability imposed by your upbringing—and it is not right to blame people 
for their disabilities. If Christ limited Himself on earth to what He could 
accomplish through His human powers and by whatever prayer would 
29We can now deliberately avoid appetite by taking pills; a first-century Jew did not 
have that option. Perhaps first-century Jews knew that certain illnesses suppressed appetite 
and knew enough to be able to bring these on voluntarily. But that would not have been a 
reasonable means, because there was a fairly high likelihood that the resulting state—near-
starvation plus a (further?) illness—would be worse than near-starvation plus hunger. In 
any case, if the Spirit’s intent were to have the Son fast and be tempted by desire for food, 
avoiding the desire by deliberately becoming ill would have been disobedience. 
30The illustration is Robert M. Adams’s.
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unleash, He could find Himself with this sort of state-desire; liability to 
disability is part of being human. Suppose on the other hand that you 
could work to eliminate those desires, but have not, due to non-culpable 
ignorance about the need or the possibilities for improvement. In this 
case you are excused. Your condition is regrettable, but your values are 
an imposed disability you inculpably do not know you can help. If you in-
culpably do not know that your sickness is curable, it is not right to blame 
you for continuing to be ill. If Christ while on earth limited His access to 
knowledge to whatever His human nature and prayer could provide, He 
could find Himself with this sort of state-desire. This exculpation extends 
to any state of temptation these state-desires produce.
My second approach to Christ’s temptations, then, asserts that all 
state-desires that press Him toward temptation and evil, and all His temp-
tations, are blameless in one of the ways just sketched. This gives Him 
access to a representative range of human states of temptation, and lets 
Him enter them fully, not just stop short with state-desires. But it keeps 
His moral record clean. The price? Perhaps just a closer look at James. Here 
is the James text in context:
When tempted, no one should say, “God is tempting me.” For God cannot 
be tempted by evil, nor does he tempt anyone; but each one is tempted when 
he is dragged away and enticed by his own evil desire. Then after desire has 
conceived, it gives birth to sin, and sin . . . to death. Don’t be deceived . . . 
Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of 
the heavenly lights, who does not change like shifting shadows. He chose 
to give us birth through the word of truth, that we might be . . . firstfruits of 
all he created.31
I read this as follows: God, who cannot be tempted, does not tempt to 
evil. Rather, He sends only good things [and so not temptation to evil]. 
Constancy is part of His character. As it is and He has chosen to send the 
good of new birth, planning to make us firstfruits, He will not so change 
as to lead us away from Him instead by tempting us to evil. The key point 
for present purposes is that the whole passage concerns the same being, 
the God who cannot be tempted, who is also referred to as the Father. The 
Father never was incarnate. Read in context, then, though the James text in-
cludes a sentence that would normally assert (1), James asserts not (1) but
1*. God unincarnate cannot be tempted by evil.
(1) is not compatible with my thesis that God incarnate can be tempted by 
evil, when it is blameless to be so. (1*) is. It is also obviously compatible 
with (2)–(4), which concern either us or God incarnate.
Complications of Incarnation
Let us now consider a third way to deal with (1)–(4). (1) makes a claim about 
God apart from the Incarnation. The Incarnation introduces complications. 
31James 1:13–18.
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To explain them I must say a bit about act-individuation. There are finer- 
and coarser-grained approaches to individuating actions. The finer the 
grain, the closer we get to a 1:1 pairing of descriptions with actions: use a fine 
enough grain and buttering my parsnips is not the same action as buttering 
them quickly. On a coarser-grained approach, these are two descriptions 
of a single action. Individuating actions coarsely, the same action can be 
tempting under one but not under another description. If I am hungry, it 
is tempting to eat the food on that plate, leaving nothing behind. Even if I 
am hungry, it is not tempting to eat my wife’s dinner, leaving her nothing to 
eat. The one description engages my love and moral knowledge and assures 
that no action-desire arises. The other does not engage either and just leaves 
my animal nature to assert itself. In what follows I take a coarse-grained 
approach. This is purely an expository convenience. When I speak of being 
tempted to act under one but not another description, I could make equiva-
lent points in terms of being tempted to do an act doing which entails (in the 
circumstances) doing others which are not tempting.
Now to the substantive point about the Incarnation. The orthodox view 
is that Christ had His full divine natural endowment while incarnate. 
But there has been great disagreement about how He had it, how much 
access He had to how much of what He had, and what special graces 
God bestowed on Him in His human natural endowment. Suppose that 
Christ while on earth prior to the Resurrection had access only to a normal 
human sum of knowledge—that while He had no false beliefs, He did not 
have the use of some divine knowledge. Suppose that He was then vol-
untarily operating with one hand tied behind His back cognitively, doing 
all His processing with a human brain and only as much information as 
that brain could acquire from its environment. Then He could think of 
an action under a description and not have His omniscience bring all its 
other descriptions to His immediate attention. In particular, He could 
think of it under a description which did not make its moral qualities sa-
lient, and not have a morally salient description of it also come at once to 
mind if this was not blameworthy. Then for the period in which it was not 
blameworthy not to have a morally relevant description of the action in 
mind, perhaps it would not be culpable to want to do even an evil action. 
Ignorance excuses; so does inability to access knowledge one possesses, 
which is functionally and morally equivalent to ignorance. By becoming 
incarnate, the Son became (so to speak) subject to a glitch due to finite 
processing capacity and speed in the human natural endowment to which 
He bound Himself. God the Son would not be culpable for enduring this 
glitch if He had non-culpable reasons to become incarnate, nor then cul-
pable for cognitive and other consequences the glitch imposes—including 
temptation. In fact, morally sufficient reasons to become incarnate would 
have to include morally sufficient reasons to suffer temptation, if it is suf-
ficiently likely that if incarnate He would be tempted. Thus if the glitch 
alone makes it possible for a pre-Resurrection Christ to be tempted to do 
evil, He would not be culpable for being tempted. By becoming incarnate, 
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the Son gave up a measure of control over His desires. He let it become the 
case that a human natural endowment could force desires on Him before 
His divine personality could get into the act. One can be blameworthy 
for the consequences of giving up control, as one is for hitting a child 
while driving drunk. But whether one is blameworthy depends on why 
one gave up control. If one got drunk and drove merely to feel good, one 
deserves blame. If one got drunk and drove because someone threatened 
credibly to kill two children unless one did, hitting the child is still tragic, 
but one is excused for doing so. So it matters that the Son’s reasons for 
giving up control be morally praiseworthy, and if they are, perhaps that’s 
all we need say.
It is not a psychological impossibility to want or even try to do an action 
one cannot do, if one is not thinking of that about it which makes it impos-
sible to do or thinking that anything makes it impossible to do. Perhaps 
Goldbach’s Conjecture is false. If it is, no-one can prove it. But as long as 
this is unknown, mathematicians will be able to want to prove it and be 
tempted to prove it. For being tempted is just a matter of what desires etc. 
one has, and as I’ve just noted, one’s desires need not line up with the facts 
about one’s abilities. Thus on the “glitch” approach, the pre-Resurrection 
Christ could want to do what the unincarnate Son cannot do.
God the Son cannot form a desire to do evil if not incarnate. While 
incarnate, He has the attitudes and personality which guarantee this result 
if He is not incarnate. But attitudes etc. can manifest differently depending 
on the conditions under which they operate. They can if nothing else take 
longer to manifest because having to work through a limited human 
endowment rather than an unincarnate God’s psychology. Perhaps this 
allows the formation of conscious desires to do what are de facto evil acts, 
which endure for brief periods while morally salient descriptions of those 
acts are on the way to consciousness. If it does, it allows for act-desires the 
Son must resist—and will resist once the appropriate bit of His knowledge 
is humanly on-line. If this is true, God the Son could indeed be tempted 
to do evil just as we can be, at least for brief periods. Christ’s divine per-
sonality and attitudes would guarantee that the moral and the dimension 
of relation to His Father would quickly come to mind, quickly enough to 
forestall a move toward doing any evil. It would also guarantee that He 
not want to do any act under a description which made its evil salient.
Here too, then, we replace (1) with
1*. God unincarnate cannot be tempted by evil.
We then take (2)–(4) to point out that the special conditions of the Incarna-
tion permit divine temptation to do evil due to limitations of the Son’s 
human nature.32 This works because His reasons for being able to be 
32These limitations make us less able than a perfect being is and render even a perfect 
being liable to temptation when under them. Does it follow that being finite in these respects 
is an imperfection? If it does, then humans who are not incarnations of divine Persons are 
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tempted toward evil excuse Him for being tempted. This third approach 
also makes Christ’s temptations blameless, but offers a different reason 
they are so and thus lets His temptations involve a wider variety of state- 
and act-desires.
Is There a Problem about Perfection?
One can raise a question here. Being tempted to do evil can include having 
desires it is bad to have. Even if one is not blameworthy for them, they 
are moral imperfections. God is morally perfect. A morally perfect being 
has no moral imperfections. So perhaps even blameless temptations are 
incompatible with Christ’s divine character. I offer three replies to this.
One is that this argument takes the doctrine of divine moral perfection 
too far. As I parse it, moral perfection requires perfect virtue and having 
no unmet obligations.33 It does not go beyond that. This argument unfairly 
moves the goalposts.
Another is that for a God morally perfect if not incarnate to let Him-
self suffer bad desires while incarnate is lowering Himself for love’s sake. 
Doing so is thus actually admirable. If it is, its consequences cannot be 
viewed as things it would be better not to suffer in the circumstances, i.e., 
given the reason for which they are suffered. On the contrary, the worse 
they are, the more admirable He is for suffering them, and so the better it 
is (in one respect) that He suffer them. If I let the crowd pelt me with filth 
to earn your freedom, you upon release from jail should see the stains on 
my clothing as marks of honor rather than things to sniff at. So too, then, 
we might honor Christ rather than downgrade Him for being tempted. 
Further, ability and willingness to lower oneself for love may then turn 
out to be part of true moral perfection.
One might also answer in terms of a compositional model of the In-
carnation. Perhaps the doctrine of divine moral perfection is really with 
regard to intrinsic moral qualities. On a compositional model, the Incarna-
tion adds a body and soul to God the Son, composing a three-part whole, 
rather than (say) His somehow turning into one or both. On such a model, 
imperfections the Son incurred due to composition with the body and soul 
of Jesus would be extrinsic—because the body and soul are added to the 
Son. Extrinsic bad desires are compatible with perfection in all intrinsic 
moral properties.
Freedom, Responsibility and Resisting Temptation
If God cannot do evil, Christ had to resist His temptations. Perhaps the 
manner was up to Him, but the result was not. That poses the question of 
how His doing so could be free and morally responsible. This is no idle 
matter. If it was not, He did not have a freely, responsibly achieved sinless 
essentially imperfect beings, even if they are perfect humans. To me that is not an implausible 
claim. Surely no human who is not an incarnation of a divine Person is a perfect being.
33See my “God’s Deontic Perfection,” Res Philosophica 90 (2013), 69–95.
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life to offer to God, and taking Him as a moral exemplar is a bit like taking 
a robot as one.
I now suggest that on either main approach to the scope of moral re-
sponsibility, Christ is morally responsible for resisting His temptations.
On the “expressivist” account, I am responsible for whatever appro-
priately expresses my rational judgments, values or character. It does not 
matter that I cannot do otherwise; I am responsible because the act is a 
genuine outflow (in the circumstances) of my real self. Well, Christ’s re-
sistance was a genuine outflow of His real self, though He could not have 
done otherwise. So on this sort of account, He is morally responsible for 
not giving in.
I now argue that this is so on a control-based account too. Suppose that 
I see a leper and want to bathe his sores, but am paralyzed by disgust. I 
want to bathe them. I want to act on that want. But my first-order desire 
not to touch sores keeps me from acting; the closer I get to the sores, the 
more disgusted I become, and so no matter how much I want to help, I 
cannot. Fortunately, I have a Mother Theresa pill. I know that if I take it, I 
will be unable to resist bathing the sores of the next leper I see. I am now 
fairly far from the leper, and so my disgust is not so intense as to keep me 
from acting on my desire to act on my desire to help. So I momentarily 
focus only on my desire to help the leper, pushing disgust aside. I take 
the pill while gazing at the leper, and presto: leper gets relief. I cannot 
do otherwise. The wonders of chemistry and my current sensory input 
determine my action. Still, I submit that I am responsible for what I do. 
Fully foreknowing what would ensue, I voluntarily made myself unable 
to do otherwise. I intended to do the act. I had to make myself unable to 
do otherwise in order to act successfully on that intention. So I did so, and 
my prior intention—formed when I could do otherwise—governed my 
behavior. That I could not do otherwise at the time does not make the act 
involuntary or unintentional: I volunteered for it by taking the pill, and it 
is because I intended to do it that I took the pill. So my lack of alternatives 
does not remove my responsibility. It leaves me praiseworthy. I wanted 
to help the leper. I intended to do so. I had the ability to avoid doing so 
when I formed the intention and so acted on it as to realize it. The only 
thing unusual about my generation of my action is that I passed up my 
chance to do otherwise not at the time of the act, but earlier. Why should 
that affect how well you think of me for bathing the leper’s sores, if you 
know the whole story? Perhaps you will think that I would have been 
more praiseworthy had I overcome mounting disgust step by step, with 
ever greater difficulty, as I approached the leper. Instead, you may think, 
all I overcame was the level of disgust I had when I took the pill. But I 
suffered just the amount of disgust I would have suffered otherwise. Fur-
ther, I overcame it—I kept walking toward the leper—with just the effort I 
would have exerted otherwise, with the degree of effort I would have had 
in mustering it. It is just that I could not help but exert that effort. That 
is how the pill works. In a sense, my suffering was worse: for I suffered 
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knowing that I was helpless to turn back and find relief, knowing that 
even worse was in the offing and could not be avoided. I let myself in for 
this fully foreknowing that I would feel so (we can suppose). In relation 
to suffering and overcoming disgust, then, the precise basis for my desert 
of praise is nonstandard, but it is not obviously less than in the usual case.
In like manner, God can be responsible for satisfying obligations though 
He cannot do otherwise at the time, if He freely chose to make Himself 
unable to do otherwise then. His nature requires Him to fulfill His obliga-
tions. But it is up to Him whether He takes on any obligation He ever has 
to a human. If He does take one on, His doing so is His taking a Mother 
Theresa pill. He takes on the obligation to do an act voluntarily, because 
He wants to fulfill it, knowing what will ensue, while able to do otherwise. 
(He can avoid doing the obligatory act by avoiding the obligation.) He 
thus makes Himself unable to refrain from the obligatory act. But as in my 
leper case, He is responsible for that act because of the conditions under 
which He gave up His ability not to do it.
I now apply this to the Son. I suppose that the Son freely chose to 
become incarnate.34 Let’s suppose to simplify discussion that He did so 
knowing that if He did, He would face temptation and be unable not to 
resist. Even so, He had a choice about whether to resist this temptation. 
He had no choice about whether He would resist it if it arose—His nature 
settled that. But He had a choice about whether it would arise, and that 
was His choice about whether He would resist. He intended to resist. He 
voluntarily made Himself unable to do other than resist. He had to make 
himself unable not to resist in order to act successfully on His intention. 
So He did so, and His prior intention—formed when He could avoid re-
sisting—governed His behavior. That He could not do otherwise at the 
time does not make the act involuntary or unintentional. He volunteered 
for it by becoming incarnate, and it is because He intended inter alia to do 
it that He became incarnate. So His lack of alternatives does not remove 
His responsibility. It leaves Him praiseworthy. He wanted and intended to 
34If the sort of freedom involved includes having alternate possibilities of action, this 
might require that the Father did not command Him to do so, but instead asked in a way 
that left Him able to refuse. But we have no reason to think otherwise. (That He was com-
manded to submit to crucifixion if incarnate does not entail that He was commanded to 
become incarnate.) Still, for the decision to involve ability to refuse the Father’s request, it 
must also be the case that the Son’s perfectly loving nature would not compel Him to say yes, 
either for love of the Father or for love of us. Son and Father have access to precisely the same 
reasons favoring the Incarnation, and the very love of us pushing the Father to ask for the 
Incarnation is in the Son pushing Him to do it; further, the Father’s love for and knowledge 
of the Son might well preclude His ever asking of the Son something the Son would have 
most reason to refuse. How then could it be that the Father could ask this, and the Son 
decline? I argue in work in progress that God was able to refrain from creating. If He did 
not create, He would not become incarnate. If the Father proposed to the Son a plan which 
included creation and the Incarnation, the Son’s ability to decide against creating would also 
be an ability to decide against becoming incarnate. That creation and the Incarnation were in 
fact tied in God’s providential plan is not a novel theological thought. For an account of how 
becoming incarnate can be a responsible act if the Father commands the Son to do it, see my 
“Infinite Goodness.”
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resist. He had the ability to avoid doing so when He formed the intention. 
He passed up His chance to do otherwise not at the time of the act, but 
earlier. If this does not remove praiseworthiness in the leper case, it should 
not do so here. For Him, the alternative to resisting is not giving in, but 
never having been incarnate. I don’t see why this should affect the point at 
issue. Suppose I know that I will give in to temptation if I enter a situation. 
I want not to give in. So I make sure I never enter the situation. This is a 
legitimate strategy for avoiding giving in, and it leaves me responsible for 
not giving in. I use the strategy because I know my sole alternatives are 
giving in and not being in the situation, and I want not to give in. For the 
Son, the sole alternatives are not giving in and not being in the situation, 
and He wants not to give in. If He chooses to be in the situation because 
He wants not to give in, how does this leave Him less responsible for not 
giving in than I am in choosing not to be there in order not to give in?
On the control-based approach, Christ is derivatively responsible for 
not giving in to temptation because He chose freely and with appropriate 
knowledge to make Himself unable to give in. If we understand Christ’s 
every moral choice on this model, further, this also gives us a way Christ 
could have a responsibly achieved sinless life to offer to the Father, despite 
His inability to do otherwise.
How Christ Resisted Temptation
Hebrews 4:15 may also imply that Christ responded to His temptations 
just as we might. If He did, this is a claim that the actual causal sequence 
generating His action contains no interventions by His divine natural 
endowment, that He acted only with human power and such help as a 
human might in principle have from other divine Persons. Here’s one way 
it might have gone. Christ has a 40-days’ hunger, and the Devil tempts 
Him inter alia to make some bread. He thinks of bread. His stomach 
rumbles; He salivates. He suffers a desire to be fed, or even a desire to 
make bread. If Christ was without sin, He suffered these up to, but not to, 
the point of culpability, and stopped short. But He does not move even 
slightly down the path to bread-making. Either He wants to make bread 
only till it comes to mind that this would contravene a divine command 
to fast, or He entertains the thought of having bread without inclining 
to make bread. The latter is psychologically possible because He always 
has uppermost in His mind His relation to His Father, and His Father’s 
command to fast: His knowledge that He ought not to eat. His knowledge 
of the relevant good is complete, though human. He does not waver in 
His focus on it. Love of the Father gives Him the force of will not to be 
practically irrational and ignore what He knows, even slightly. So out of 
love, He resists that desire, or resists even having that act-desire, in His 
resistance drawing on no power that is more than human. That Christ 
had a divine nature, the natural endowment of God, does not entail that 
this endowment came into play in His resisting sin. While on earth, the 
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Son voluntarily foreswore use of His distinctively divine powers.35 He met 
temptation only with the resources of His human body and soul. He sum-
moned up reserves of human willpower, out of perfect but human love. 
Everything He did, we could do, in much the same way.
Further, it was as hard for Him as for any of us. His desire to be fed 
had a certain force. That force required precisely as much counter-force to 
resist as it would for us, though perhaps in His case what He is resisting 
is the pressure to form an act-desire rather than pressure communicated 
through an act-desire. If He drew only on human reserves, it was no easier 
for Him to summon up the counter-force than it is for us. If it takes all 
the willpower He has in His human endowment, it is no easier for Him 
to exercise this than for anyone else, even if perhaps He reaches for it 
with greater alacrity. That effort of willpower was resistance. That it had 
to succeed does not entail that it was easy for it to succeed, or that it had to 
succeed in the way I’m supposing it did, i.e., entirely without aid pumped 
in from His divine side.
A hard issue lurks beneath the surface here. Just how much did Christ 
have in His human toolkit before the Resurrection, and did it give Him 
any advantages in resisting temptation? We will probably never know. 
If the goal of the Incarnation is in part to give Adam’s race a chance to 
get right what Adam got wrong, it is compatible with this that He have 
as much love, knowledge and certainty of the good as an unfallen man 
would have—this gives Him no advantages over Adam. If the goal is in 
part to give us as we now are an exemplar, one may suspect that the more 
Christ had in His toolkit that we do not, the less He meets that goal. Yet 
it would be easier to explain His actual sinlessness without drawing His 
divine nature into the explanation if He had more in the box than the 
average human.36
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35Save perhaps in working certain miracles; He might e.g., have prayed to the Father with 
the result that the Father temporarily let the Son’s own power flow through into His human 
nature.
36My thanks to Al Mele, the editor and referees, and audiences at Florida State University, 
the University of Oklahoma, and the Institute of Philosophy (Prague) for comments on ear-
lier versions of this material.
